Dire expectations for Southeast Alaska Chinook salmon in 2018 anticipate total returns near or below the worst on record. Taku River Chinook arguably are the poorest performing stock. Less than one-fourth of the minimum escapement goal is predicted; it is the worst prediction in a long downward trend. Obviously, even greater fishing restrictions will follow
Biologists cite extremely poor marine rearing conditions for the widespread shortage. Fair enough. But don’t be misled. Poor ocean survival does not account for the entire Taku shortfall. Mismanagement of the Canadian in-river fishery, initiated in 1980 for leverage in salmon treaty negotiations, clearly has impacted Taku Chinook. Among the faults in that fishery are unreliable harvest accounting, inappropriate fishing time, and manipulation of the mark-recapture system that estimates spawning escapements. The very real effects from mishandling this fishery compound the very real results of low ocean survivals.
At least as troublesome is the parallel decline of Taku River sockeye. That reduction, covering more than 10 years, is unlike the steadier trend in other northern Southeast sockeye systems. As with Chinook, actions in the Canadian fishery have impacted Taku sockeye abundance.
Analysis by four fishermen in 2016 demonstrated that Taku sockeye escapements have been exaggerated significantly. This inaccuracy occurred in tagging sockeye at Canyon Island and calculating escapement from the proportion of tags caught in the Canadian fishery (mark-recapture). That system was badly flawed. It did not account for tags simply shed, lost to predation or, especially, caught but unreturned by Canadian fishermen. Those sockeye (or Chinook) inappropriately were assumed to spawn successfully and thus falsely inflated the calculated escapement and total allowable catch. Consequently, Alaskan harvests appeared to be less than allowed and escapements appeared greater than needed. All other fishery indicators were inconsistent with those appearances. After review, ADFG staff agreed that the mark-recapture system overestimated escapements and required substantial revision. Currently, the agency is implementing needed corrections.
There are two ugly twists to this situation. First, the Pacific Salmon Treaty sets terms for the Taku gillnet and Canadian fisheries. Negotiations are ongoing to establish harvest sharing for ten years beginning in 2019. Pressure for early resolution reportedly has produced a tentative agreement. Although Taku fishermen have been unable to see the terms, clearly the Canadian fishery benefits while Alaska’s loses. Critical to that negotiation was acceptance of the discredited mark-recapture calculations and similarly the false claims of Alaskan under-harvest. Although urged to resist agreement until accurate catches and escapements are established, Alaska’s lead negotiators chose to seek quick agreement. If that arrangement now is permitted to hold, Canada will gain harvest shares of Chinook and sockeye with no reciprocal benefit for Alaskans. This rewards the irresponsible conduct of Canada’s fishery and creates no incentive to change that behavior. Alaska’s fishermen have been thrown under the bus.
The second issue involves lack of Taku representation in Alaska’s delegation. In 2016 Juneau’s representative for 25 years was replaced by an individual totally inexperienced in the Taku fishery. Over protests, Alaska’s treaty commissioner claimed that his appointment had “industry” support although the Juneau-area fleet was unaware of the change and was afforded no opportunity to comment or recommend. Subsequent attempts to include a local fisherman in the delegation were rebuffed. In negotiating the original treaty and until this incident, every affected Alaskan fishery was represented by at least one active, experienced member. Taku fishermen participated from before 1980 until 2016. Also contrary to precedent, in 2016 and 2017 local fishermen were barred from meetings of the Alaska delegation, were denied access to written materials, and encountered a gag order forbidding delegation members’ discussion of Taku issues.
That is not and cannot be the Alaska way. Alaskans so directly impacted by state government decisions must have a voice in making them. Taku fishermen systematically were denied that voice. The officials responsible for this flagrant abuse of authority in advancing their ill-considered agenda must be held accountable. At the very least that means rescinding the tentative agreement. Negotiators then must insist on accurate, verifiable accounting for all Canadian harvests and all recaptures of tagged salmon. To do less places an unjust, unacceptable burden on Juneau’s sport and commercial fisheries and jeopardizes future sustainability of those valuable salmon populations.
•Jev Shelton has fished commercially out of Juneau for 46 years. He worked with the Pacific Salmon Treaty for over 30 years: through the original negotiations and including 15 years as Alaska’s alternate commissioner.
